Journal of Genocide Research (editie van 24 september 2012) publiceerde 'Learning on the job: Dutch war volunteers entering the Indonesian war of independence, 1945-1946' van prof. dr. Peter Romijn.

THEMA DEKOLONISATIEONDERZOEK 1945 - 1950

Pesing revisited: on exploring military violence

How archives were ignored and abused to construct a frame of war crimes

DRS. CEES SOMERS

Introduction Researching military violence can be challenging due to contradictory information or a lack thereof. Is Alexander Pope right in stating: ‘For fools rush in where angels fear to tread’? This paper focuses on a presumed case of war crimes in the village of Pesing, in the Dutch East Indies, April 15, 1946. Dr. Peter Romijn, professor of history at the University of Amsterdam and a researcher at the Dutch institute for wartime documentation NIOD, stated in two articles [1] that the ‘Pesing-affair’ is ‘exemplary for the derailing of Dutch war volunteers’ and was a ‘clear transgression of the laws of war’. These accusations have lost nothing in relevance because of his participation in a Dutch government-subsidized decolonization research assignment. Researchers involved concluded upfront that the Dutch army as an institution committed ‘excessive and extreme violence’ following 1945. If ‘Pesing’ as iconic pars pro toto is refuted, what about the other examples and the extrapolation to the Dutch army as a whole? Are ‘Pesings’ being blown out of proportion in a contemporary wave of self-constructed anticolonialism? Is this in retrospect cleaning up a politically unwanted past? Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) saw researching history as ‘will bloss sagen wie es eigentlich gewesen ist’; not the writing of history as it should have been. Pesing and alleged excessive violence of the Dutch armed forces: a review.

After Japan’s surrender

August 15, 1945, Japanese imperial forces surrendered and responsibility for the Dutch Indies shifted from American South West Pacific Area Command (SWPA) to British South East Asia Command (SEAC). General MacArthur’s Operation Satinwood to expel the Japanese from the Dutch East Indies was replaced by the British Operation Zipper[2] that was aimed at the liberation of Singapore. First Australian Corps, active in the east of the archipelago, was not deployed, but was being immobilized instead. This was in gross contradiction to British Prime Minister Attlee’s speech in the House of Commons October 1945: ‘Not only have we a strong moral obligation towards our Dutch Allies as the sovereign power until they are in a position to resume control; but also, the maintenance of law and order’. British forces entered with no more than fragmentary information. August 17, 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender, the Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno proclaimed the declaration of independence, the proklamasi, in Batavia. It had Japanese fingerprints all over. November 16, 1945, J.G. Sterndale Bennett of the British Foreign Office wrote that CinC SEAC, Louis Mountbatten, faced massive Japanese-inspired Indonesian violence[3] while the Dutch had brought welfare. The situation was beyond capacity to be controlled by nationalists’ leaders[4]4. Sir Montague Stopford, CinC Allied Land Forces in the Dutch East Indies in 1946 and as CinC SEAC from 1946 to 1947, stated that the Dutch Indies had fundamentally changed during the Japanese occupation and had been militarized down to kampong-level in German-inspired Wehrkreise defense systems. Japanese propaganda had transformed the young generation into a military trained, ruthless, Hitlerjugend-like, ideologically motivated force to be reckoned with[5]. Although SEAC had a force of up to 250.000 men at its disposal in the region, it took weeks to land a substantial force in key areas as Batavia and Surabaja. Robert Cribb stated that the newborn republic was utterly powerless as it controlled no territory, had no army and no administrative corps[6]. In his Gangsters and Revolutionaries (2009) and Benedict Anderson’s Java in a time of revolution, occupation and resistance, 1944-1946 (1972), a development toward total anarchy on Java is described, except in areas where Australian forces and the Royal Netherlands-Indies Army (KNIL) had landed. Freedom fighters, pemuda’s, religious inspired groups to downright gangsters and private armies, all wanted a piece of the cake. A first bersiap-period saw thousands killed. Cribb and Frederick called this genocide. As of August 18, 1945, pemudas started to attack Japanese police stations in the town of Serang, west of the capital Batavia. The Japanese reported 1.100 casualties, including seven hundred killed[7]. The autumn of 1945 saw robbery, looting, street murders and organized killings, in which Europeans disappeared to be found a few days later floating in one of the canals. Those whose skin color was considered too light (Chinese, Eurasians, and Europeans) or too dark (Ambonese and Timorese) were outlawed. Cannibalism occurred[8] and the rapid growth of anarchy made general Hawthorn announce Operation Pounce in December 1945 to start a sturdy mop-up of Batavia. Because the city was an essential source of income and a place to get arms, expelled revolutionaries kept reacting with hit-and-run attacks, causing increasing numbers of victims, and organized food blockades.

From ancient times attempts to reduce violence have contributed to a decline of violence[9]. The Treuga Dei or Peace of God, a suspension of hostilities during certain periods, is one example. Hugo de Groot’s (1583-1645) De iure belli ac pacis built on the ancient ius ad bellum (the ‘laws of war’) that was integrated in Christian traditions through St. Augustine’s (354-430) De civitate Dei. The Holy Church weighed between non-violent behavior and the bellum sacrum (the Holy War). Developing democracies in the 19th century were influential; as of 1922 the Dutch constitution was amended to include that the deployment of armed forces required a majority vote in parliament and the use of armed violence became a monopoly of the state. Armed forces could also be deployed for the restoration or to maintain international legal order. By analyzing violence one can run the risk of over-intellectualization[10]. During the bersiap, women clinging babies to their breast, were killed by savage mobs with bamboo spears. For them it is highly academic if violence is called ruthless or excessive, they died in total agony. This review wants to strike a blow for a model to distinguish between justified and non-justified violence by adopting a case-by-case approach.

Cultural Anthropologist dr. F. Columbijn stated that Indonesia is a violent country, but that violence is a cultural construct, varying in meaning from place to place[11]. In Beyond the Pale (Over de grens) a self-chosen overarching term ‘extreme violence’ is used at the start of the research[12] to characterize the military presence of the Dutch in the East Indies. Why putting the cart before the horse instead of starting by checking the archives for said war crimes?

Deployment of Dutch forces

When Dutch battalions entered Java, four overlapping effects occurred: 1) the effect of the general situation in Java when military came ashore, 2) their ‘rules of engagement’ (ROE), 3) the background of Dutch war volunteers, and 4) the ROE of opposing forces. In general, the archipelago saw a growing anarchy starting August 1945. Groups with a very divergent nature were fighting for power, autonomy, independence, and religious aims or had downright criminal motives. There were fights between different groups, and fights with the Japanese, British and Dutch. During massive military confrontations between SEAC and revolutionaries in Surabaja, British brigades were overrun and the negotiating British brigadier Mallaby was murdered, with heavy British retaliations as a result. SEAC, stuck to key areas, became a sitting duck and was looking for a way out.

The Dutch military build-up from 1944/1945 chose the British model of training, discipline, and equipment. Dutch forces were delayed in Malaya because SEAC did not allow Dutch battalions to enter the archipelago and this resulted in intense training in Malaya of individuals, platoons and larger units. Forces were supplemented with Dutch KNIL-officers, released from Japanese concentration camps, and Dutch manuals, such as the 'Voorschrift Politionele Taak Leger' (VPTL), the army policing duties regulations, were used[13]. The majority of the volunteers of the first Dutch battalions arriving in South East Asia had been resistance fighters back home. Discipline and morale were high as this made the difference between survival or death. They experienced a lot of hardship as housing, nutrition, and care were poor. Old war stocks were overdue, time expired or spoiled. But when deployed in Java these volunteers demonstrated such a level of professionalism that the British general Hawthorne stated: ‘Troops, second to none’. Opposing revolutionaries in the Batavia area consisted of a wide variety. Many were trained by the Japanese and had hardened, ruthless Japanese veterans amongst their midst. Here is one example: on 25 November 1945 a British Dakota carrying five RAF aircrew and twenty Maratha riflemen crash-landed near Bekasi, six miles from Batavia (Jacarta). All aboard survived the crash but before they could be rescued, they were taken prisoner by the Banteng Hitam (black buffalo) group, mutilated and chopped to pieces, their bodies being buried near a riverbank. A couple of days later, after heavy fighting, the British could exhume the buried body parts. SEAC retaliated in force and burned down Bekasi[14]. In Pesing, April 15, 1946, the four conditions above were met.

Topographic map of the Pesing area (photo: National Archives, via author's personal collection)

When SEAC allowed Dutch forces to enter the archipelago in April 1946, 2-14 R.I. infantry-battalion was deployed to Batavia to assist in the restoration and maintenance of security. As of mid-1945 Batavia was plagued by hit-and-run attacks out of the villages surrounding the city[15]. Pesing was a fortress with hundreds of Indonesian national Army (TNI) and ruthless Laskar Rakjat pemuda’s. Most villagers had left and moved to British/Dutch occupied areas. ‘Learning’[16] states that revolutionary fighters were mostly armed with clubs and spears. In fact, weaponry of the Japanese 16th Army, including tanks and artillery, had been handed over to the revolutionaries in large quantities. E.g., in Pesing they were armed with mortars and heavy machineguns and had built trenches and fortifications. The Dutch action, in response to the umpteenth attack on Batavia, was a complete surprise, because British troops normally hardly responded. Accurate mortar fire chased away most of the opponents in full flight to regroup afterwards. With the occupation of an important bridge the Dutch action was completed in just over an hour and a half. The troops acted in line with the regulations on ius in bello and ius in bellum[17]. Deployed after a legitimate decision of the Dutch parliament, with a right of self-defense, the action was necessary, justified, and proportional. A clear find, fix and strike through a frontal attack followed by the envelopment of Pesing. It brought casualties on both sides and the Dutch took some thirty prisoners into custody.

Deeper analysis of the Pesing-case

The analysis in ‘Learning’ - a ‘transgression of the laws of war’ - bears no burden of proof. J. Veenstra, a Dutch publicist, stated on national television in 1969 that the Dutch took ‘some seventy prisoners, most of whom were subsequently beaten up, executed and thrown into a river’[18], but only the first part of what he said was quoted.

The second part of his statement was not used and his 1946-article was not accepted after a fact-check. This was also omitted. Besides, Veenstra told that he was not the source, but Indonesian propaganda was. This too was omitted as was his 1969 letter to Het Parool, in which he stated that the Pesing story had gotten bigger than it really had been. In this contribution he did not repeat his remark on prisoners being killed[19]. ‘Learning’ is far from accurate by ignoring that Dutch war volunteers had been in active military service as of 1944 and had fought the German army in Germany. They combined a core of sturdy British discipline with KNIL technical support. When ‘Learning’ added 'alcohol' to the English translation of a Dutch expression in the English edition, a clear integrity line was crossed. War volunteers’ basic food rations often were scanty. ‘Learning’ overlooked Allied forces’ presence, with the inclusion of KNIL-1Bat, in the archipelago[20] in 1944/45 in at least three operations, Biak, Tarakab and Balikpapan. Why was the overwhelming Japanese influence on the proklamasi ignored? A longtime ritual originating from the Portuguese explorers centuries ago amongst sailors passing the equator for the first time, was framed by Romijn as a ‘ritual bath’ on a ‘scenic’ route giving it a nonexistent connotation. As if they had to be cleansed as a preventative measure for the misdeeds they were to commit later?

Gevangenen, Pesing (foto: Nationaal Archief)

List of prisoners who volunteered to join the Dutch Army (photo: National Archives/Pesing)

Indeed, 2-14 R.I. Battalion suffered its first casualty by an opponent’s sniper in Batavia. And it responded. The use of Beb Vuyk’s story about Pesing in the leftist periodical De Baanbreker as an objective source is arbitrary. Ms. Van Willigen-Vuyk was married to a plantation owner, opposed colonialism and supported Indonesian independence. Even before the Japanese attack she was being watched by the Dutch secret service. She was active in Indonesian propagandists’ circles, naturalized Indonesian after the independence and became a member of Sharir’s socialist party. What was the influence of Indonesian propaganda on Van Willigen-Vuyk in constructing a story without verifiable information at hand? Veenstra’s rumors and novel[21] are ‘Learnings’ principal burden of proof next to at that time blocked dossiers in the National Archives. Why was a military whistle-blower constructed? File number 3741 of the National Archives was released January 1, 2022 and contains a lot of applicable information[22].

After the Pesing action, defamatory rumors about prisoners being killed were published by Beb Van Willigen-Vuyk. After Veenstra’s article on Pesing was rejected by Het Parool, he wrote a letter to Dutch member of parliament Nico Palar who raised questions in parliament using Van Willigen-Vuyk’s article. There was an immediate response from governments in the Netherlands as well as in the Dutch East Indies and, according to file nr. 3741, several investigations were launched. Furthermore, there are letters written by the CinC, General Spoor, dated May 27, 1946, in which he describes the action, that prisoners were made, taken away and that wounded were taken care of in presence of Red Cross staff. Opponents on the battlefield could not be buried because of ongoing sniper fire which also killed a Dutch military medic, who was treating a wounded opponent. Spoor assumed the fallen opponents had been buried later by the local population.

The Headquarters Allied Forces Netherlands East Indies (HQ AFNEI) report stated that ‘Pesing’ was within the regular patrol area of 2-14 R.I. ‘It is the custom of all battalions to patrol within their area’ and since the village of Pesing was a continuing source of trouble and the Indonesian opponent TRI ignored all allied proposals, the commander of Batavia agreed to an attack. The battalion commander wrote in his report dated April 16, 1946, that 31 opponents were taken prisoner. One of the opponents killed in action was a Japanese officer (named Kakyasi/C.S). Reports from Head Political Information, the Justice Department, the director of Justice, the director of the Cabinet of the Governor-General and the appointed committee: all were clear that no prisoners had been killed. File nr. 3741 also contains several witness accounts, both from Dutch military as well as from three prisoners. The three prisoners (Misan bin Doellah, Karta bin Animan and Hasbi bin Salim) stated that some had been hit, but they had been treated well, fed, properly dressed and that no prisoners were killed. Most of the prisoners wanted to enlist in the Dutch army.

Captain Dirk Paris Roosenburg, the whistleblower mentioned in ‘Learning’, when asked how these rumors had come into being, stated that the accusation of member of parliament Nico Palar of atrocities were lies. Dutch military Johannes Francken stated that his captain had ordered not to shoot unnecessary, but to take prisoners instead. Isaak Boekhout told prisoners were used for closing pitfalls on the road to Pesing. Commander of the Military Police Soeratman said no atrocities had taken place and captain Roosenburg ordered to have the wounded looked after by a medic. Chaplain Van de Vrande said that a prisoner who walked away had been shot, but this was not officially confirmed. Van de Vrande had not observed any atrocities. Health officer Hendrik Borst stated that the wounded were treated well and were checked later by Indonesian- and international Red Cross staff. The battle report mentioned that bombs, artillery shells, mortar shells, landmines, a three-inch mortar, heavy and light machineguns, stacks of ammunitions and food were confiscated. SEAC-archives[23] endorsed these conclusions. SEAC-officers did criticize however the prison cells that were initially made available for captured opponents. Due to the heavy stench of urine conditions were considered appalling.

In numerous articles in the international press published as of April 1946, i.e., prior to ‘Learning’[24], a regular Dutch reaction on repetitive attacks from Pesing to Batavia was mentioned. Pesing was a regular military action, and no prisoners were murdered, as claimed in ‘Learning’[25] British SEAC-archives, Dutch national archives, international publications, and press releases, all these verifiable sources are overwhelming in their confirmation hereof. Furthermore, there is no information in the archives referring to the existence of a whistle-blower. His presence was entirely fictional in Veenstra’s work of fiction and in Beb van Willigen-Vuyk’s article and was ‘Learnings’ deus ex machina in an attempt to prove what’s unprovable. The journalist Veenstra was affiliated with Het Parool as a freelancer, he wasn’t a war correspondent, and he was not at the scene of the action. Historian Gert Oostindie mentioned Veentra as being embedded in ‘Soldaat in Indonesië’[26], which was as a mistake[27] since Veenstra’s claim was based on hearsay. The use by researchers of a chapter out of Veenstra’s novel Diogenes in de tropen (Diogenes in the tropics) in an attempt to prove Dutch atrocities, is as ludicrous as explaining the Battle of Borodino with Tolstoi’s War and Peace. ‘Learning’ states that the whistle-blower, captain Roosenburg, had met after the attack in Batavia with Dutch Labour Party member of parliament Frans Goedhart for the disclosure of information. However, at that time Goedhart was in the Netherlands for parliamentary sessions in The Hague and did not travel to the Dutch East Indies[28] until months later.

‘Learnings’ hobbyhorse, cover-ups, is downright ridiculous. ‘Pesing’ was investigated by general Spoor and his staff, by justice departments in the Netherlands and the East Indies, by a parliamentary committee, by British officers on the day in question, by TNI-representatives[29], by SEAC[30}, by AFNEI[31], by the Indonesian- and the International Red Cross, in 1969 by the Dutch Committee on excesses and by many historians[32]. ‘I know of soldiers who fired at opposing forces that they aimed their fire that high that they were sure no innocent people would be hurt’[33], shows the distinction between ability and willingness to fire.

What happened in the Pesing-region days and weeks after this confrontation with the Dutch? The Laskar-group took revenge by the raping and slaughtering of approximately one thousand local Chinese men, women, and children in the Pesing-area. A few weeks later a patrol of the Dutch ‘Margriet’ battalion was ambushed and surrounded. Running out of ammunition, they tried to break free from the fight. One man died, three escaped and six were taken prisoner by Laskar. Patrols sent to the rescue found that the six men taken prisoner were stripped down, dragged with ropes to a small kampong where they were severely tortured, mutilated and one-by-one chopped to pieces.

Graves of fallen Dutch soldiers of volunteer-Batallion 'Margriet' on the airfield of Tjililitan (photo: National Archives)

Conclusion

‘Learning’ is a textbook example that a case-by-case approach, based on verifiable research, shows the vulnerability of unfounded far-reaching conclusions. Answers should be found in archives, not in opinions. The files, as well as conducted research, contain exculpatory evidence. ‘Learning’ is inaccurate by introducing Pesing as a pars pro toto cornerstone of excessive violence in Beyond the Pale. When integrity of research is at stake, integrity of researchers follows. The cornerstone of verifiable historical research should be based on profound research in the archives and literature. History is not to be cobbled together on political opinions because in the end that is a first step in the decline of reliable research. Study of history must meet requirements of the scientific discipline that it is.

Notes

  1. P. Romijn, 'Learning on the job: Dutch war volunteers entering the Indonesian war of independence, 1945-1946'. Journal of Genocide Research, September 24, 2012 (situates Pesing west of Batavia) and H. Bennett en P. Romijn, ‘Liever geen onderzoek’. How scandals over colonial violence could be defused in British and Dutch politics (1945-1960). BMGN, 135-2 (2020), pp. 52 -71 (situates Pesing in East Java).
  2. NL-HANA 2.22.21. Inventory of the digital collection 'Afscheid van Indië' 1940-1962. No. 619 Extract from Staff Study Operation Satinwood (…) Aug 1945.
  3. National Archives United Kingdom (N.A.U.K.), Letter from the British Foreign Office on British policy in the Netherlands East Indies and in Indochina, London, 16 November 1945.
  4. N.A.U.K.; Telegram Lord Mountbatten on the situation in Indonesia 21 November 1945.
  5. N.A.U.K., Note Ltgen Montague Stopford on the British commitments in Netherlands East Indies, (Nov 22, 1946).
  6. Robert Cribb, 'A revolution delayed: the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands Indies, August-November 1945'. In The Australian Journal of Politics and History (1986), 32, no1. p 75.
  7. Benedict Anderson, Some aspects of Indonesian politics under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945 (1961), p.114.
  8. Amongst others: thesis Robert Cribb, Jakarta and the Indonesian Revolution (1984), p. 106.
  9. Steven Pinker, The better angels of our Nature. Why violence has declines (2011).
  10. Hannah Skoda, Medieval Violence in Northern France 1270-1330 (2013).
  11. F. Columbijn, Roots of violence in Indonesia (2002), p. 8.
  12. Beyond the Pale (2022), p. 102. Original title: Over de grens.
  13. VPTL emphasizes in short, the fair treatment of the people, respect for its culture and respect for the belongings of others. Prisoners should be treated in a decent way.
  14. R. McMillan, The British occupation of Indonesia 1945-1946 (2005), p.79-80.
  15. Overwhelming number (international) contemporary newspaper reports. Next: Nieuwe Haarlemsche Courant, November 5, 1945. Het Dagblad, April 18, 1946, no. 148.
  16. See note 1.
  17. Jus ad bellum refers to the conditions under which states may use armed forces in general. Jus in bello regulates the conduct of parties engaged in armed conflict.
  18. 'Learning on the job', p. 317.
  19. Het Parool, June 13, 1969.
  20. Romijn, ibidem, p. 323.
  21. Veenstra, Diogenes in de tropen.
  22. NLNAHa 2.10.14 Inventory archive Algemene Secretarie Nederlands-Indische regering en de daarbij gedeponeerde Archieven. File nr. 3741: Misdragingen Nederlandse militairen bij de bezetting van Pesing (Misconduct of Dutch military personnel at the occupation of Pesing) 1946, april.
  23. National Archives, SEAC archives, wp 203/2466/RC 3204282.
  24. R. McMillan, ibidem, p. 90. W. en J. Kot, Van Burger tot Veteraan. Bataljon ‘Zeeland’, hoe en waar? In de periode 1944-1948 (2002) (From civilian to veteran. ‘Zeeland’ batallion, how and where).
  25. The Argus, Melbourne, April 18, 1946, p. 5. Commander Batavia agreed in the attack.
  26. G. Oostindie, Soldaat in Indonesië, (Soldier in Indonesia) p. 160.
  27. Email Gert Oostindie, May 21, 2021.
  28. M. de Keizer, Frans Goedhart (2012), p. 171.
  29. Subject: Pesing Incident, by major Wibowo in: ‘Kementerian Pertahanan Bagian Penghoeboeng, Djakarta. ‘When and where will the prisoners in this incident be handed back to Indra? (Indra: Indonesian Republican Army).
  30. SEAC British National Archives, AFNEI, WO 203, 2466, RC 3204292.
  31. British National Archives, AFNEI, WO 203, 2466, RC 3204292.
  32. Amongst whom MacMillan, ibidem, p 89-90.
  33. Quotation from many as such in Dutch War diaries. J.T. Ploeg, Sterren die blijven (1989), p. 100.